Moderation (Μετριοπαθεια)
Aristotle on the Second of 11 Moral Virtues
In his discussions of this and other principles, Aristotle suggests that while virtue must be cultivated and habituated, it must also be intentional—“lying in a mean and being determined by the right reason” (and the right desire) where the virtuous “mean” that is the goal is not an average amount—nor a scant or excessive amount—but rather the appropriate amount of the thing in question, based on the specifics of the situation at hand.
This very description bears some resemblance to the characteristics of moderation, wherein the virtuous amount of something is not only an “appropriate” amount (taking into account the variables particular to the scenario in question), but generally an amount that falls between an excess of the thing and deficiency or dearth of it.
Scholars have noted, however, that because the primary aim of moderation is individual health and well being, the achievement of moderation should perhaps be described as a “reasonable” or smart characteristic to cultivate rather than a virtuous or noble one, per se.
This observation is notwithstanding the indirect correlation of moderation with other more virtuous acts based on the generally higher level of well being afforded of moderation, from which the individual may indeed derive both a greater likelihood of demonstrating other more virtuous or noble behaviors and a greater ability to demonstrate moderation.
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Books 3 & 7
Translated from the original Greek by Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins*
“(Book 3) CHAPTER 11. … But as for all the pleasures that are conducive to health or good conditioning, these the moderate person will long for in a measured way and as he ought; he will long also for such other pleasures as do not impede the healthy pleasures, or are not opposed to what is noble, or do not outstrip his resources. For he who is disposed to the contrary is fond of such pleasures more than they are worth, whereas the moderate person is not of this sort but is as correct reason commands.”
“(Book 3) CHAPTER 12. … If, then, this longing will not be obedient and placed under that which rules, it will grow too great, for the longing for pleasure is insatiable and bombards from all sides someone who lacks sense; the activity of the desire increases the innate desire …
… and if the desires are great and intense, they drive out calculation.
Hence [these desires] ought to be measured, and few, and in no way opposed to reason—we say that a thing of that sort is “obedient” and “chastised”—and just as a child ought to live in accord with the command of his tutor, so too the desiring part ought to live in accord with reason.
Hence the desiring part of the moderate person ought thus to be in harmony with reason: the target for both is the noble, and the moderate person desires what he ought and in the way that he ought and when. It is also in this way that reason commands. Let these things, then, be stated by us concerning moderation.”
“(Book 7) CHAPTER 7. Now, some pleasures are necessary, others not, and the former are necessary only up to a certain point (those that are excessive are not necessary, and neither are the deficient ones); and what concerns desires and pains is similar. Given all this, the person who pursues the excessive pleasures, in an excessive way or through choice, doing so for the sake of the pleasures themselves and for nothing else that results from them, is licentious. For this person necessarily feels no regret and so is incurable, since the person without regret is incurable. But he who falls short is the opposite, he who is in the middle, moderate.
And similar is the case of someone who avoids the bodily pains not because he is defeated by them but through choice. Now, among those who do not choose, one type is led by pleasure, another by avoiding the pain arising from desire, and so they differ from each other. It would seem to everyone to be worse if someone should do something shameful, though he felt no desire for it or only a mild one, than if he should so act because of a strong desire, just as it would seem to be worse if someone should strike another without being angry at him than if he did so in anger. For what would such a person do, were he in the grip of a passion?
Hence the licentious person is worse than the one lacking self-restraint. So, of the characteristics mentioned, the one is rather a form of softness, whereas the other person is licentious. He who lacks self-restraint lies opposite the self-restrained person, the steadfast opposite the soft. For being steadfast consists in holding out against something, whereas self-restraint consists in overpowering it; and holding out is different from overpowering, just as not being defeated is different from winning. Hence self-restraint is also more choiceworthy than steadfastness.
But the person who falls short in relation to what the majority strain against and are capable of—he is soft and delicate. For such delicacy is in fact a sort of softness: for example, he who lets his cloak drag, so that he not suffer the pain of lifting it up, and who, though he imitates someone sickly, does not suppose that he himself is wretched, similar though he is to the wretched. The case is similar also as regards self-restraint and lack of self-restraint. For if someone is defeated by strong and excessive pleasures or pains, that is not to be wondered at. Rather, he is apt to receive sympathy if he at least strains against them … and just like those who, though they attempt to restrain their laughter, burst out laughing all at once …”
“(Book 7) CHAPTER 9. Is, then, a self-restrained person someone who abides by any argument whatever and any choice whatever, or does he abide by only the correct choice? And is a person lacking self-restraint someone who fails to abide by any choice whatever and any argument whatever, or does he fail to abide by the argument that is not false and by the choice that is correct, as in the perplexing question encountered before? Or is it only incidentally that the argument and choice involved are of this or that sort, but it is the true argument and the correct choice in themselves that the self-restrained abides by and the other does not abide by? For if someone chooses or pursues this given thing on account of that given thing, he pursues and chooses this latter in itself, the former only incidentally. And by ‘in itself’ we mean ‘unqualifiedly.’
As a result, in one sense the self-restrained person abides by any opinion whatever, while the person lacking self-restraint departs from it; but in an unqualified sense, it is the true opinion that the one abides by and the other departs from. There are also some who are inclined to abide by their opinion, whom people call obstinate; such people are hard to persuade and, once persuaded, not easily changed. They have a certain similarity to the self-restrained person, just as the prodigal has to the liberal and the reckless to the confident, but they are different in many respects. For the one, the self-restrained person, does not change on account of passion and desire, but it may sometimes happen that he will be readily persuadable [by reason]; whereas the obstinate are not persuadable, when they take hold of given desires, and in fact many of them are led by pleasures. Obstinate types are the opinionated, the ignorant, and the boorish, the opinionated being such on account of the pleasure and pain at stake: they delight in the victory they gain, if their persuasion undergoes no change, and they are pained if their own opinions become null and void, like decrees.
As a result, they resemble more the person lacking self-restraint than they do the self-restrained … For not everyone who does something on account of pleasure is licentious or base or lacking self-restraint; rather, he who does something on account of a shameful pleasure is such. But since there is also a sort of person who enjoys the bodily pleasures less than one ought and who does not abide by reason, the self-restrained person is in the middle between this person and the one lacking self restraint: the person lacking self-restraint does not abide by reason because he enjoys something more than he ought, this person because he enjoys something less than he ought, while the self-restrained person abides by reason and does not change on either account.
If in fact self-restraint is something serious, both of these contrary characteristics ought to be base, just as they in fact appear to be. But because the characteristic that leads one to enjoy pleasure less than one ought appears in few people and on few occasions, then just as moderation is held to be the sole contrary of licentiousness, so too self-restraint is held to be the sole contrary of the lack of self-restraint. Since many things are spoken of by way of a certain similarity they may share, it has followed that we speak of the self-restraint of the moderate person by way of a certain similarity they share: the self-restrained person is such as to do nothing, on account of the bodily pleasures, that is contrary to reason, and so too is the moderate person. But the one person has, and the other does not have, base desires; and the one is such as not to feel pleasure contrary to reason, the other such as to feel the pleasure but not to be led by it. Those lacking self-restraint and the licentious are similar as well, though they are in fact different: both pursue the bodily pleasures, but the one does so while supposing he ought to, the other while supposing he ought not to.”
*Aristotle. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Translated, with an interpretive essay, notes, and glossary by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins. London: University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 2011. (Available at Amazon)
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