Justice (Δικαιοσυνη)
Aristotle on the Last of 11 Moral Virtues
Moving down from this discussion of the complete justice regarded as perfection of character, Aristotle goes on to discuss injustice having to do with what we might call greed, defined here as wanting or grasping for an excess (or an unfair, or inequitable amount) of something—specifically something that is beneficial to the individual—for example, money or honor.
In the various chapters of Book 5, Aristotle discusses justice related to (1) compliance with the law or (2) what is equitable/fair, or (3) both what is lawful and equitable (i.e., justice in its most comprehensive and virtuous form), but goes on to make distinctions between justice associated with one’s own self and justice related to the community (others). His description of justice that concerns equity then leads to greater detail on what happens when one member of a community can have more or less (either way, an inequitable or “unequal” amount) of something that is divisible, like a good or product, as well as the various types of distribution, as well as rectification for inequity in transactions.
Related to the former, he discusses distinctions between what is generally termed “distributive justice” (which only applies among “equals”) versus “corrective justice,” where the latter can be either voluntary or involuntary. He provides a dramatic list of examples for the involuntary. Interesting, if not surprising, is the clarification that in discussions of equity—or the virtue associated with getting or having the same amount of something as another person—this equity is assumed to be within parameters in which there is already parity in status or position of the parties being compared.
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5*
Translated from the original Greek by Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins**
“CHAPTER 1. Concerning justice and injustice, we must examine what sort of actions they happen to be concerned with, as well as what sort of mean justice is and of what things the just is a middle term. Let our examination be in accord with the same method of inquiry employed in the matters discussed earlier. Now, we see that everyone wishes to say that justice is the sort of characteristic on the basis of which people are disposed to do just things and on the basis of which they act justly and wish for just things. It is the same way also concerning injustice—that it is that on the basis of which people are unjust and wish for unjust things. Hence for us too, let these things first be set down as an outline.
… Now, it seems that justice and injustice are spoken of in various ways, but because their meanings are close, their sharing of the same name is not noticed and is not as clear as it is in cases in which the meanings are far apart (for then the difference in their outward appearance is great) —as in the case, for example, of what is called by the same name ‘kleis,’ either the collarbone of animals or that with which people lock doors.
So let us grasp in how many ways the unjust person is spoken of. The lawbreaker, then, is held to be unjust, as is he who grasps for more and is unequal. It is clear as a result that the just person will be both lawful and equal. The just, therefore, is what is lawful and what is equal; the unjust is what is unlawful and what is unequal.
… The unjust person does not always choose the greater share but chooses also the lesser share of things unqualifiedly bad. Yet because the lesser of what is bad also seems to be in some way good, and since to be grasping is to be after what is good, it is on this account that the unjust person is held to be grasping for more. He is unequal as well, for this [inequality] comprehends and is common [to taking both the greater share of the good and the lesser of the bad].
Since, as noted before, he who is a lawbreaker is unjust and he who is lawful just, it is clear that all lawful things are somehow just. For matters defined by the legislative art are lawful, and each of these we declare to be just. The laws pronounce on all things, in their aiming at the common advantage, either for all persons or for the best or for those who have authority, either in accord with virtue or in some other such way. As a result, we say that those things apt to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the political community are in a manner just.
… This justice, then, is complete virtue, though not unqualifiedly but in relation to another person. And on account of this, justice is often held to be the greatest of the virtues, neither the evening star nor the morning dawn being so wondrous. And, speaking in proverbs, we assert that ‘in justice, every virtue is summed up.’ Further, it is the most complete virtue because it is the use of complete virtue; it is complete because he who possesses it is able to use virtue also in relation to another, and not only as regards himself.”
*Nicomachean Ethics Book 5 = Eudemian Ethics Book 4
**Aristotle. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Translated, with an interpretive essay, notes, and glossary by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins. London: University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 2011. (Available at Amazon)
“CHAPTER 2. … That the justices are multiple, then, and that there is also a certain other justice besides the whole of virtue, is clear. But one must grasp what and what sort of thing it is. Now, the unjust has been defined as both the unlawful and the unequal, the just as both the lawful and the equal. It is then to the unlawful that the injustice previously mentioned [that is, complete injustice] pertains. Since the unequal and the unlawful are not the same thing but different, as part in relation to whole—for everything unequal is unlawful, but not everything unlawful is unequal—so also the unjust and injustice [in the partial sense] are not the same but different from [the unjust and injustice in the complete sense], the former as parts and the latter as wholes. For this injustice is a part of injustice as a whole, and similarly also this justice is a part of justice as a whole. As a result, one must speak also about both partial justice and partial injustice, and in like manner about the just and unjust that correspond to them.
… One form of partial justice, and of the just thing that accords with it, is found in the distributions of honor or money or any of the other things divisible among those who share in the regime (for in these things it is possible for one person to have a share that is either unequal or equal to another’s). The other form of such justice is the corrective one involved in transactions, and of this latter there are in turn two parts; for some transactions are voluntary, others involuntary. The voluntary ones are of the following kinds: selling, buying, money lending, pledging security, investing, making deposits, and letting for hire (they are said to be voluntary because the beginning point of these transactions is voluntary). Of the involuntary transactions, some are covert, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, slave stealing, slaying by treachery, and bearing false witness; others are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, death, rape, maiming, slander, and outrage.”
“CHAPTER 8. … Since the just and the unjust things are as stated, someone acts unjustly or performs a just act when he does these things voluntarily; when he does them involuntarily, he neither acts unjustly nor performs a just act, except incidentally. For people do just and unjust things incidentally, but an unjust and a just act are defined in terms of the voluntary and involuntary: when the act is voluntary, it is blamed, and at the same time it is then also an unjust act, so that there will be something unjust but not yet an unjust act if voluntariness is not present in addition. I mean by voluntary, as has been stated earlier as well, whatever act is up to a person and he performs knowingly, not in ignorance of either the person acted on, the means used, or that for the sake of which he acts.”
“CHAPTER 10. … The perplexity concerning what is equitable, then, arises for pretty much these reasons. But all such considerations are in a certain way correct and do not stand in any opposition to one another. For the equitable, though it is better than the just in a certain sense, is just, and it is not because it belongs to a different class of thing that it is better than the just. Therefore, the just and the equitable are the same thing, and although both are serious, the equitable is superior. This is what produces the perplexity, because although the equitable is just, it is not what is just according to law. The equitable is instead a correction of the legally just.”
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