Honesty (Εντιμοτητα)

Aristotle on the Virtuous Mean Aligned with Truth

Much as with his discussion of other virtues, Aristotle addresses the virtue of honesty by presenting it between extremes regarding “truth” that readers can readily understand, namely the “boaster” who exaggerates and pretends he is more or in some regard better than he is, and the person Aristotle refers to as the “ironist,” who does the reverse, deprecating his qualities or achievements to others.

Aristotle points out that in both instances of the extremes in this category (seen in the boaster and the ironist) the individual may diverge from truth either because he has (or perceives himself to have) something to gain—either socially or materially—by doing so, or because this is simply the type of person, with the sort of character (or lack), who enjoys what they are doing. (Presumably these explanations are not mutually exclusive and are, at least in theory, at work in tandem in many scenarios.)

With regard to these two extremes, Aristotle suggests that the boaster’s actions are, in most cases, considerably more egregious than the ironist’s, primarily due to the increased likelihood that the boaster is either acting with the goal of heightening his own reputation or stature by exaggerating the truth, or acting with the goal of obtaining some sort of material gain. Unsurprisingly, Aristotle distinguishes between the level of “baseness” of character demonstrated in each of these latter scenarios, with the greater offense being perpetrated by the boaster acting with the goal of achieving material gain to which he would not otherwise be entitled, had he revealed the truth.

After inserting the caveat that this discussion does not apply to legal issues of truthfulness (for which he indicates another virtue better applies), Aristotle then goes on to discuss the “plain dealer”—the person who behaves and acts in accordance with the truth—both in instances in which nothing depends on his allegiance to the truth and instances in which social or material gain might be at stake. He suggests that this person upholds the truth in scenarios in which nothing depends on it for the simple reason that “he is a lover of the truth” and because being “truthful both in speech and life” is “his characteristic”—part of the character he has worked to cultivate and habituate. Aristotle goes on to provide greater insight on the virtue of honesty by means of focusing on the concept of “truth,” saying plainly:

“In itself, what is false is base and blameworthy, whereas what is true is noble and praiseworthy. In this way too, he who is given to truthfulness, being characterized by the middle term, is praiseworthy.”

Such a simple, yet profound pronouncement reflects this fundamental aspect of the truth, as characterized during Aristotle’s time—namely that, instead of merely being positioned as “better than” falsehood to a greater or lesser degree, it is regarded (notably without any apparent religious association) as “noble and praiseworthy” in and of itself, reflecting that it is a critical and elemental component both in the character and behavior of noble individuals as well as in any type of advanced society, within which critical decisions and actions at the most basic level rest and rely on truth in its myriad forms.

 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Books 2 & 4

Translated from the original Greek by Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins*

“(Book 2) CHAPTER 7. Concerning the truth, then, let the person in the middle be said to be somebody truthful and the mean, truthfulness; the pretense that exaggerates is boastfulness, and he who possesses it, a boaster, whereas that which understates is irony and he who possesses it, an ironist.”

“(Book 4) CHAPTER 7. Let us speak similarly also about those who tell the truth as well as those who state falsehoods related to speeches and actions, that is, in relation to what it is they pretend to. The boaster, then, seems apt to pretend to qualities held in high repute, both qualities he does not actually possess and those that are greater than the ones he does possess, whereas the ironist, conversely, seems to deny the qualities he actually possesses or to make them less; and the person in the middle between them is a kind of ‘plain dealer,’ since he is given to truthfulness, both in his life and his speech, acknowledging that the qualities he possesses are his own and neither exaggerating nor diminishing them. It is possible to act in each of these ways either for the sake of some goal or for none. The sorts of things each person says and does, and thus how he lives, are determined by the sort of person he is—if he is not acting for the sake of some goal.

In itself, what is false is base and blameworthy, whereas what is true is noble and praiseworthy. In this way too, he who is given to truthfulness, being characterized by the middle term, is praiseworthy; but both of those given to falsehoods are blameworthy, though more so the boaster. Yet let us speak about each, and first about the truthful person. Now, we are speaking not about truthfulness in the case of agreements or anything that extends into the realm of injustice or justice (for this would belong to another virtue). Rather, in the situations in which nothing of that sort is involved, the person we are speaking of is truthful both in speech and in life because such is his characteristic.

A person of this sort would seem to be decent because he is a lover of truth; and if he is truthful in the situations in which being such makes no difference, still more so will he be truthful in the situations in which it does. For he will guard against what is false on the grounds that it is shameful, especially when he is also used to guarding against it in itself. And such a person is praiseworthy. He will incline more in the direction of [saying] less than what is true, for this appears more refined, given the irksomeness of the excesses in this regard.

He who pretends to qualities greater than he possesses for no particular purpose resembles a base person (for otherwise he would not enjoy lying), and yet he appears more silly than bad. But when some goal is at issue, he who pretends to more than he is for the sake of reputation or honor is not overly blameworthy as a boaster, whereas he who does this for money (or anything that would lead to money) is more unseemly. (It is not in having the capacity to boast but in making the choice to do so that someone is a boaster, for choice accords with one’s characteristic, and he is a boaster because he is that sort of person.)

In this same way too, someone given to falsehood either enjoys falsehood in itself or longs for reputation or gain. Some who boast for the sake of reputation, then, pretend to the sorts of qualities that are praised or are thought to bring happiness; others, who boast for the sake of gain, pretend to qualities that please their neighbors, the false pretense to which can go unnoticed—for example, when they pretend to be a prophet, a wise man, or a doctor. On this account, most people pretend to and boast of such things, since the criteria just mentioned are present in [those areas of expertise].

Ironists, who tend to say less than they are, appear more refined in their characters. For they seem not to speak for the sake of gain but as people who avoid bombast. And they especially deny having qualities held in high repute—as, for instance, Socrates used to do. Those who deny small and manifest things are said to be humbugs and are rather contemptible, and sometimes such denial appears as boasting—as in the dress of the Spartans, for example. For both excess and extreme deficiency are boastful, but those who use irony in a measured way and concerning things that are not extremely obvious come to sight as refined in their irony. The boaster appears to lie opposite the truth teller, since he is worse than the ironist.”

*Aristotle. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Translated, with an interpretive essay, notes, and glossary by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins. London: University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 2011. (Available at Amazon)

Practical Application

for Ethical Leadership

As leaders, honesty may seem in many respects straightforward, given that the choice of aligning oneself with “truth”—irrespective of consequences—is a choice to be made on an almost ongoing basis each day. And as Aristotle mentions, we are quick to realize—for ourselves and others—scenarios in which divergence from the truth may elicit some sort of benefit.

Yet according to this principle, we must not only guard against the obvious and fundamentally egregious instances in which falsehood may appear and “debase,” but perhaps more importantly, learn to discern the difference in even small actions—even those in which there may not even be something to be gained or lost by the decision.

In cultivating such awareness, alongside the corresponding discipline to transform to habit maintaining alignment with the truth, we pass one of the most fundamental hurdles of ethical leadership.

And yet we are not sufficiently naïve that we cannot immediately see also the strands and threads of nuance that flow through such internal decisions.

If we are not, strictly speaking, fully aligned with truth, many will counter with “it’s almost the truth” or “it’s mostly the truth,” perhaps covered over with an icing that reassures us by suggesting that no one is hurt by our actions (or very hurt by them), or even that we have done some good for others in not aligning with truth.

And while it does seem that Aristotle would distinguish between “levels of baseness” reflected by such relativistic or “means to an end” justifications, the fact remains: if “truth” is required in order not only to ennoble one’s own character (and in doing so enrich one’s life) but also to make decisions that benefit others, cultivating strict adherence to the principle in both small ways and larger ones allows us to develop and elevate our character in ways necessary for ethical leadership.

Indeed, the argument in favor of honesty—defined as strict alignment with and adherence to “truth” in smalls ways and large—is massively bolstered by the impact it has on those around us. Where we see falsehood and corruption running rampant, the (immediate) “cause” is nearly always tied to “culture”—or what is acceptable within a specific environment. But there is no escaping that to diverge from truth in interactions with others by definition robs them of the ability to decide and act based on facts and reason—in that way, it can be considered not only deceitful, but cowardly. And if we choose to operate on the slippery slope with regard to honesty—justifying and excusing actions that we have deemed of insufficient importance to apply ethical principles—that thinking will become what is not only tolerated, but valued around us. It will be our culture and legacy, no matter how small we perceive our offenses to be. Changing ourselves, our organizations, or the world for that matter will require more of us—will demand that we be models of something more noble and virtuous—and that is what must be our standard.