Generosity (Γενναιοδωρια)

Aristotle on the Virtue Tied to Giving and Receiving Money

It may in fact be a slight misnomer to indicate that generosity is, from Aristotle’s perspective, the virtue most closely linked to the giving and receiving of money—we should therefore clarify at the outset that what we are referring to when we say “money” may be better defined as “anything whose value is assigned or calculated in terms of money.”

Further clarifying the discussion around generosity, we should also say that there are several categories, terms, and definitions used by Aristotle that we use today and may be confident that we understand; however, we must be cognizant that our modern day use and assumed definitions—often related to the evolution of connotation—may not be consistent with Aristotle’s. For any who may wonder, Aristotle’s use is invariably the more strictly correct. Having said that, every effort will be made to point out potential terms, the definition of which may not be consistent with modern usage.

At the most basic level, Aristotle’s discussion on generosity begins with a familiar presentation of the virtue as the noble and appropriate mean between two excessive, yet mostly opposing extremes—in this case, stinginess and wastefulness. He then goes on to provide greater detail using at least three terms that are commonly assumed to mean something at least marginally different in Western usage today.

The first is the term “generosity” itself, which for Aristotle covers not only the giving of money (and items valued using monetary units, which we will henceforth refer to collectively for the sake of simplicity as “money”), but also the receiving of money. Second, Aristotle refers to the person who demonstrates generosity (in both the giving and taking of money) as having “liberality” or being “liberal.”

Finally, moving the discussion to the excess of “wastefulness” in giving and taking, he uses the term “prodigality” to describe the individual in question. While some readers may more closely associate what is being described here as “profligacy” (as associated with waste—e.g., a “profligate spender”), for the sake of consistency, we will refer to this behavior or quality as prodigality. Aristotle clarifies further that (perhaps unlike some views of a “prodigal” person), the prodigal’s excessive spending is not entirely directed at himself and that, to some degree, others are the beneficiaries (worthy or not) of his behavior. He also points out to individuals of his own time that “prodigality,” while generally used to describe deficiencies of character that exist as a result of numerous vices at one time,  should actually be defined more narrowly, stating:

“… we sometimes assign the term prodigality to a combination of things, for we call prodigal those who lack self-restraint and who, in their licentiousness, spend lavishly. Hence the prodigal are held to be very base people, since they have many vices simultaneously. But in fact they are not appropriately called by this name, because a ‘prodigal person’ means someone who has one vice, namely, ruining his own resources.”

With such clarifications and caveats out of the way, we jump straight to Aristotle’s description of the basic characteristics of the generous person, which features (as do his discussions of many of the virtues) a strong emphasis on what is appropriate, or what we “ought” to do:

“Since, then, liberality is a mean with respect to the giving and taking of money, the liberal person will both give and spend on what he ought and as much as he ought, in things small and great alike, and he will do so with pleasure. Moreover, he will take from where he ought and as much as he ought: since the virtue is a mean with respect to both giving and taking, he will do both as he ought …”

It is interesting to note at this point that for Aristotle, the “appropriate” value of (and associated emphasis on) money is not for its own sake, or necessarily for the aggregation of wealth; rather, money is considerably more utilitarian—that is, it is to be valued similarly to resources of any other kind: for its ability to accomplish certain (noble) things.

Aristotle acknowledges that while the virtue involves appropriate amounts of both giving and receiving, the generous person receives gratitude and is praised far more for giving than not taking, a phenomenon he attributes to the greater difficulty in giving away one’s own resources than in simply “not taking” resources in scenarios in which such an action may not be appropriate. He goes on to note that praise for a generous person’s “not taking” resources which would be inappropriate to take are more closely linked to the virtue of justice rather than that of generosity. He also makes a sweeping statement that of all the virtues, generosity is unique in being the most praised— and even loved—saying:

“Of all those who act on the basis of virtue, liberal human beings are perhaps loved most, for they are advantageous to others, and this consists in giving.”

He notes as well that, as with other virtues, degree of generosity does not equate to the amount given, with the clear understanding that a person with fewer resources may demonstrate greater generosity in giving a smaller amount than is give by a wealthier person who gives—strictly speaking—more money, but does so from situation of far greater wealth.

And while he does not appear overly concerned with the matter, Aristotle notes also that the generous person may be more easily taken advantage of (i.e., “swindled”) owing to his relatively lower regard for the importance of money for its own sake.

Aristotle also takes time to delve more deeply into the two excesses and deficiencies at the extreme ends of the mean—involving both giving and taking—that is, stinginess and prodigality. He distinguishes between them, however, noting their apparent inverse relationship, wherein prodigality is demonstrated by both an excess of spending (which in this case takes the form of giving) and a deficiency in taking what is appropriate, while stinginess is the reverse, characterized by excessive taking and deficiency in spending (i.e., giving).

He then goes on to discuss the relative baseness or corruption of each of the excesses—prodigality and stinginess, noting that in general, stinginess is the worse, and prodigality the far less serious offense. He backs up this conclusion by noting that the prodigal is at some point likely to “self correct” or be otherwise reformed “by age” and/or running out of money.

In addition, he notes that, in general, the prodigal has the internal “raw materials,” so to speak, for generosity, as demonstrated by excessive spending/giving, suggesting he might be “cured” to become generous simply by removing the excessive element from his behavior. He also mentions that the behavior of the prodigal does at least in some form or fashion benefit someone/others, while the behavior of the stingy has no such beneficial effect.

 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book 4

Translated from the original Greek by Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins*

“CHAPTER 1. Let us speak next in order about liberality. It seems, then, to be a mean with respect to money. For the liberal person is praised not in situations of war or in those in which the moderate person is praised, or, again, in those that involve legal adjudications. Rather, he is praised when it comes to the giving and taking of money, and more with regard to the giving of it. (We mean by money all those things whose worth is measured in legal currency.) Prodigality and stinginess are excesses and deficiencies pertaining to money; and while we always ascribe stinginess to those who are more serious about money than they ought to be, we sometimes assign the term prodigality to a combination of things, for we call prodigal those who lack self-restraint and who, in their licentiousness, spend lavishly. Hence the prodigal are held to be very base people, since they have many vices simultaneously. But in fact they are not appropriately called by this name, because a ‘prodigal person’ means someone who has one vice, namely, ruining his own resources.

… Moreover, gratitude flows to one who gives and not to one who refrains from taking, and praise even more so. It is also easier to refrain from taking than it is to give, for people are less inclined to give away their own property than they are to refrain from taking that of another. And those who give are spoken of as liberal, whereas those who refrain from taking are praised, not with a view to liberality, but more with a view to justice; those who take are not praised at all. Of all those who act on the basis of virtue, liberal human beings are perhaps loved most, for they are advantageous to others, and this consists in giving.

… Liberality is spoken of in reference to a person’s resources, since what is liberal consists not in the specific amount given but in the characteristic of the giver, and the characteristic relates to his resources. In fact, nothing prevents the person who gives a lesser amount from being the more liberal one, if he gives from a lesser total amount. And those who did not acquire what they themselves own but inherited it seem more liberal, for they are without the experience of need; and all people are fonder of the works [or products] that are their own, just as parents and poets are. It is also not easy for a liberal person to be wealthy, since he is inclined neither to accept nor to safeguard money; rather, he is inclined even to throw it away, since he does not honor money on its own account but rather for the sake of giving it. Hence the accusation is leveled against chance that those who most deserve wealth are the least wealthy in fact. Yet this happens not without reason, for it is not possible to possess money without taking the requisite care so as to have it, just as is the case with other things. The liberal person surely will not give to whom he ought not and when he ought not or any other such thing, since he would then no longer be acting in accord with liberality; and by spending on these things, he would not be able to spend on the things he ought.

For, just as was said, he who spends in accord with his resources and on what he ought is liberal, whereas he who exceeds these is prodigal. Hence we do not speak of tyrants as prodigal, because for them to exceed their great wealth, through gifts and expenditures, seems no easy thing. Since, then, liberality is a mean with respect to the giving and taking of money, the liberal person will both give and spend on what he ought and as much as he ought, in things small and great alike, and he will do so with pleasure. Moreover, he will take from where he ought and as much as he ought: since the virtue is a mean with respect to both giving and taking, he will do both as he ought, for this sort of taking corresponds with equitable giving, whereas what is not of this character is contrary. The giving and taking that correspond with each other, then, arise simultaneously in the same person, but the contrary kinds clearly do not. If he happens to spend contrary to what he ought and to what is noble, he will be pained, though in a measured way and as he ought, since it belongs to virtue to feel both pleasure and pain at the things one ought and as one ought. The liberal person, moreover, is easy to deal with in money matters, for he can be done injustice, since he does not honor money, at any rate; and he is more vexed if he fails to spend what he ought than pained if he does spend what he ought not, and he is not content with the view of Simonides. The prodigal person thoroughly errs in these matters too, for he neither takes pleasure in the things he ought or as he ought, nor is he pained. This will be more manifest as we proceed. It was stated by us, then, that prodigality and stinginess are excesses and deficiencies, and in two ways—in giving and in taking—for we put spending in the category of giving. Now, prodigality exceeds in giving and not taking, and is deficient in taking, whereas stinginess is deficient in giving but exceeds in taking, though only in small things.

The different parts of prodigality, then, do not all fit together, since it is not easy to give to all while taking from none: resources quickly run out for those who give their own possessions to others, and these are the very people who are held to be prodigal. Yet this sort of person, at least, would seem to be better, and in not a small way, than the stingy person, because he is easily curable, by the effects of both age and want, and he can arrive at the middle term because he possesses the traits of the liberal person: he both gives and does not take, but in neither case does he do so as he ought or well. If, then, he should be habituated in the manner indicated, or changed in some other way, he would be liberal, for he will give to whom he ought and not take from where he ought not. Hence too his character does not seem to be base, since to exceed in giving and in not taking is the mark of neither a corrupt nor a lowborn person, but of a foolish one. He who is prodigal in this manner is held to be much better than the stingy person, both on account of the points stated and because the prodigal person benefits many and the stingy no one, not even himself.”

*Aristotle. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Translated, with an interpretive essay, notes, and glossary by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins. London: University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 2011. (Available at Amazon)

Practical Application

for Ethical Leadership

As ethical leaders, generosity may not be the first virtue to spring to mind when considering working within an organization, surrounded by tasks and deadlines and dashboards and metrics—all related to the competition, or deliverables, or initiatives, or end products we are working each day to create. Something akin to “separation of church and state,” we may be more likely to regard our personal and social spheres as more the purview of “things generous” than our corporate or professional lives.

Nonetheless, Aristotle’s prompting to cultivate and turn to habit what is “generous” reminds us that as organizational leaders, relegating generosity to the position of “afterthought” or “nice to have”—rather than thoughtfully and intentionally working to incorporate it into the entirety of our beings—leaves far too great an opportunity on the table with regard to benefit—for others who may be beneficiaries of our actions, those for whom our behavior serves as an ethical model to emulate, and perhaps most of all for us as individuals.

In considering the incorporation of generosity into every aspect of our character as something to be nurtured and cultivated, Aristotle reminds us that the noble “mean” with regard to money or similar resources we possess ourselves or have oversight of is simply to do with it (in both giving and taking) as “we ought.” And while a resource can only in a sense be used for a single thing at a time rather than multiple things at once—requiring decisions around where we should spend our money, where we should not, and in what circumstances it might even be appropriate to take money—Aristotle in no way implies that acts of generosity come at the expense of other appropriate things for which we have responsibility. Rather, our ability to correctly balance the the options for the myriad “oughts” (defined here as appropriate opportunities to demonstrate generosity within the larger parameters of financial responsibilities we have) will mature as we cultivate other associated virtues, such as wisdom and and practical judgement.

Indeed, it goes without saying that increasingly, many of the best performers in our workplaces are not only looking for, but actively using social consciousness as an exclusionary criteria as they determine who to work for—and with. For this new breed of “employee” and workplaces dinosaurs alike, demonstrations of authentic generosity and social advocacy—determining to do “what we ought” with the resources we have at our disposal—is becoming a “must have” that not only makes our cultures and workplaces more appealing to “the best of the best” but also more tightly ties them personally to our organizations, a scenario that inspires and brings out the best possible creations and achievements for all of us.

And lest it go overlooked, remember too that Aristotle speaks specifically to the “pleasures” experienced by the generous. As one of the true “win-wins” we are likely to encounter, intentionally cultivating generosity in ourselves and our organizations is “work” likely to yield unanticipated and unbounded benefits—for all involved.