Friendliness (Φιλικοτητα)

Aristotle on the Nature of Virtuous Social Conduct

In his work Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggests that while virtue must be cultivated and habituated, it must also be intentional—“lying in a mean and being determined by the right reason” (and the right desire) where the virtuous “mean” that is the goal is not an average amount—nor a scant or excessive amount—but rather the appropriate amount of the feeling, emotion, or behavior in question, based on the specifics of the situation at hand and the players involved. Reduced to its most fundamental essence, Aristotle’s virtue of “friendliness” is characterized by the person who “approves of what he ought, and in the way he ought” and conversely disapproves of “what he ought, and in the way he ought” rather than blindly (or for the purposes of pursuing reward) accepting or rejecting all things.

With regard to social conduct, Aristotle positions the mean of what may be translated “friendliness” or even amiability within the larger discussion of moral virtue and ethics in social interaction, contrasting the desired mean—for the purposes of illustration and clarification—between its excessive relation (obsequiousness) and its deficiency (churlishness), both of which appear focused mainly, if not entirely, on “self” with regard to ease or advancement/reward rather than taking into account or giving consideration to what would be virtuous or desirable with regard to another individual or group of individuals. The elevation of perception beyond considerations of self is a principle factor characterizing Aristotle’s desired society.

 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book 4

Translated from the original Greek by Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins*

“In our associations with one another, both in living together and in sharing in speeches and actions, some people are held to be obsequious: those who praise everyone with a view to pleasing them and oppose nothing, but rather suppose they ought not to cause pain to anyone they may meet. At the opposite extreme to them are those people who oppose everything and give no thought whatever to causing others pain, people who are called surly and quarrelsome.

It is not unclear, then, that the characteristics spoken of are blameworthy and that the middle term with respect to these—in accord with which a person will approve of what he ought and in the way he ought, and similarly also disapprove—is praiseworthy. But a specific name has not been given to this characteristic, though it seems most like friendship (or friendliness).**”

*Aristotle. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Translated, with an interpretive essay, notes, and glossary by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins. London: University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 2011. (Available at Amazon)
**Or simply, “friendship” (philia). Books 8 and 9 examine philia, understood there not as a moral virtue but as a kind of community or association that the virtues help make possible.

Practical Application

for Ethical Leadership

As ethical leaders, consideration of a virtue called “friendliness” may appear at first glance to lack the depth or import of many of the Aristotelian principles, or even to have little real relevance to ethical organizational behavior. Yet “friendliness” by Aristotle’s definition is entirely more gritty and relevant than what the term may initially connote to today’s leaders. For Aristotle, the virtue of “friendliness” characterizes the interactions of those who have cultivated and matured such weighty virtues as justice, practical judgement, wisdom, and even courage (to name only a few), bringing them to bear in each interaction “to approve what they ought, in the way they ought, and similarly also to disapprove.” Aristotle himself acknowledges the limitation of language to describe such a virtue, except to say that it is perhaps most similar to friendship (or friendliness).

When considered in this manner, Aristotle’s “friendliness” has enormous import and relevance for all interactions within an ethically-run organization. What would happen if we, as ethical leaders, modeled social behavior that demonstrated that we approved of what was right and true, and disapproved of what was not? What if our organizational cultures nurtured the idea that determining—and appropriately responding to— what is acceptable and good (or not acceptable and good) is not the result of a calculation involving political expediency, fear of retribution, opportunity for personal advancement or gain, or myriad other fundamentally self-serving factors?

What would happen if ethical leadership in our organizations reinforced (and even rewarded) interactions that demonstrated the cultivation and maturing of virtues like wisdom, practical judgement, understanding for others, and even courage (to name only a few)—that would equip us to identify and appropriately respond to what we see and hear in the workplace—approving of “what we ought” and disapproving or pushing back on “what we ought, in the way we ought.” For many, such an environment might seem a pipe dream—a state too distant and foreign to ever be realized. But consider too the power, influence, and opportunity we have as leaders and individuals to model, nurture, and drive real and authentic change in ourselves, our workplaces, our communities, and even the world.

And lest we consider such sentiment too “Pollyanna” or naïve for our particular workplace realities, remember that the single most powerful factor in determining the long-term success, or “greatness,” of virtually any purpose-driven organization—whether a business, non-profit, committee, government agency, or volunteer group—is its people, and by association, their interactions. How many interactions would it require to begin to shift your organizational culture? For leaders and front-line workers alike, how many would be influenced if we modeled approving what is right and (appropriately) standing against what is not? What would happen when those around us see that our determinations are not based on self-serving factors but on something more universally ethical, or “noble?”

Aristotle reminds us that with regard to this (and other) principles, the virtuous individual is responsible for acting both freely and deliberately based on an internal assessment of what is right and appropriate to each situation and the actors involved. The challenge of course is that such determinations must be made without regard to many—if not all—of the motivations that typically characterize present-day organizational “politics.” So as ethical leaders, we must develop not only the habit of demonstrating this virtue, but also all others that enable it. In today’s organizational dynamics, such a choice is likely to be viewed by many as simplistic and perhaps even irresponsibly naïve, yet in reality it is the opposite of both.

Considering the virtuous mean of the (somewhat awkwardly-named) virtue of “friendliness” then, along a continuum whose extremes range from passivity to domination, the ethical leader will eschew—for example—self-interested responses characterizing either end of this spectrum. This includes both excessive acceptance and praising designed to curry favor, or feign support or loyalty to garner reward—as well as excessive or unwarranted opposition or combativeness, demonstrated by those whose most basic goal is to amass and wield power. Given the state of today’s corporate standards, many of us will have our work cut out for us in this regard as we seek to advance ethical leadership and show what can be accomplished by ethically-run organizations.