Fairness (Ακριβοδικια)

Aristotle on Equality as a Component of Justice

As noted in the discussion of the virtue of justice, equity—or “fairness”—comprises one of the two main components of what Aristotle describes as just or noble (the other being adherence with the law). With regard to fairness, he provides two categories in which justice involves equity—in the distribution of divisible or discrete goods within the community, and in transactions between individuals—although the parameters surrounding “equity” are different for each.

With regard to distribution of elements such as goods or services, Aristotle notes that fairness—or equity—can only be discussed or applied in situations in which both parties are themselves already equal in role or stature. In other words, distribution should be “equal among equals”—this can be thought of as a sort of “proportional equality” whose justice is discussed as follows:

“For if the people are not equal, they will not have equal things. Rather, from this arise fights and accusations, either when people who are equal have or are distributed unequal things, or when people who are unequal have or are distributed equal things.”

In the second scenario in which Aristotle discusses equity—which he refers to as being relevant in “transactions” between parties—one party has taken more than what is “fair”—or equitable—leaving the alternate party with less. Using examples that include theft and adultery, Aristotle discusses the role of the law as a corrective mechanism to right the injustice or inequality, saying:

“For it makes no difference at all whether a decent person robs a base one, or a base person a decent one, or if a decent or a base person commits adultery. Rather, the law looks only at the difference that stems from the harm done, and it treats persons as equals: if the one person acts unjustly, the other suffers injustice; and if the one did harm, the other was harmed. As a result, since the unjust in this sense is an inequality, the judge tries to restore equality … by inflicting a loss, thereby taking away the gain [of the other party].”

In this limited sense then, what is termed “corrective justice” appears blind as to initial parity between the parties involved in the transaction. For all other scenarios, it would appear that equity or fairness is assumed to be virtuous and just only to the degree that there was already parity in status or position of the parties involved.

 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5*

Translated from the original Greek by Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins**

“CHAPTER 3. Since the unjust person is unequal and what is unjust is unequal, it is clear that there is also a certain middle term associated with what is unequal. And this is the equal, for in whatever sort of action in which there are degrees, the more and the less, there is also the equal. If, then, the unjust is unequal, the just is equal, which is in fact what is held to be the case by everyone, even without argument. Since the equal is a middle term, the just would be a certain middle term. The equal involves at least two things. It is necessary, accordingly, for the just to be a middle term as well as equal, both in relation to something and for certain persons. In the respect in which it is a middle term, it is between certain things (these are the more and the less); in the respect in which it is equal, it involves two things; and in the respect in which it is just, it is for certain persons.

It is necessary, therefore, for the just to involve at least four terms: the persons for whom it happens to be just are two, and the things involved—the matters of concern—are two. And there will be the same equality for the persons and the things involved: as the latter (the things in the given circumstances) are related, so also are the former. For if the people are not equal, they will not have equal things. Rather, from this arise fights and accusations, either when people who are equal have or are distributed unequal things, or when people who are unequal have or are distributed equal things. Further, this is clear from what accords with merit, for all agree that what is just in distributions ought to accord with a certain merit. Nevertheless, all do not mean the same thing by merit; rather, democrats say it is freedom; oligarchs, wealth; others, good birth; aristocrats, virtue. The just, therefore, is a certain proportion. Proportion is not peculiar to abstract number alone, but belongs to number generally. For proportion is an equality of ratios, and it involves at least four terms.

… The just in this case, then, is the proportional; the unjust is what is contrary to the proportion. The unjust, therefore, is both what is more [than the proportion], on the one side, and what is less than it, on the other, which is in fact what happens when it comes to our deeds: he who acts unjustly has more of the good, and he who suffers injustice, less, and the reverse in the case of what is bad. For the lesser share of what is bad, compared with the greater share of it, falls into the definition of what is good: the lesser bad is more choiceworthy.”

“CHAPTER 4. The just in transactions is a certain equality, and the unjust, a certain inequality, yet not in accord with the proportion just indicated but in accord with an arithmetic one. For it makes no difference at all whether a decent person robs a base one, or a base person a decent one, or if a decent or a base person commits adultery. Rather, the law looks only at the difference that stems from the harm done, and it treats persons as equals: if the one person acts unjustly, the other suffers injustice; and if the one did harm, the other was harmed. As a result, since the unjust in this sense is an inequality, the judge tries to restore equality. For indeed, if one person is struck and the other strikes, or if he also kills him and the other dies, the suffering and the doing involved are divided into unequal segments. But the judge tries to restore equality by inflicting a loss, thereby taking away the gain. For the term gain is used as a way of speaking simply in such circumstances (even if in certain cases it would not be the proper name—for example, for the person who struck another), and the term loss is used for him who suffered. But, at any rate, whenever the suffering is measured, the one is called a loss, the other a gain. As a result, the equal is a middle term with respect to what is more and less, while the gain and the loss are more and less in opposite ways: more of the good and less of the bad is gain, the reverse is loss. The middle term with respect to these is, as we noted, the equal, which we say is just; as a result, the just that is corrective would be the middle term when it comes to loss and gain.”

*Nicomachean Ethics Book 5 = Eudemian Ethics Book 4
**Aristotle. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Translated, with an interpretive essay, notes, and glossary by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins. London: University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 2011. (Available at Amazon)

Practical Application

for Ethical Leadership

As ethical leaders, the complicated matter of “fairness” or equity within our organizations is one that will require us to continually re-consider and even challenge our own views of what is “just.”  We are likely quite comfortable with the notion of “corrective justice” he describes for individual transactions, in which equity does not require parties to be “equal” at the outset.

Organizational scenarios that might apply in this category might include fraudulent financial behavior by an employee, where the employee has taken more than his or her fair share and left the company with less. So too would be a situation involving sexual harassment, in which one party has “taken” in some way more than is “fair” or appropriate, leaving the corresponding party with less. In such cases, we can clearly understand Aristotle’s explanation of justice:

“Rather, the law looks only at the difference that stems from the harm done, and it treats persons as equals: if the one person acts unjustly, the other suffers injustice; and if the one did harm, the other was harmed. As a result, since the unjust in this sense is an inequality, the judge tries to restore equality … by inflicting a loss, thereby taking away the gain [of the other party].”

Yet the second category of fairness Aristotle describes around distribution of goods or services may make us less comfortable. With its more qualified parameters describing where “equity” is just or noble, his reasoning may appear elitist and unfair.

At the same time, we are still likely to see some of the reasonableness or “justice” he describes in our own scenarios. On the most basic level, for example, most would agree that it would not be just to distribute equal compensation to all members of an (organizational) community if their responsibilities and/or contributions were not equal or if they did not work an equal number of hours.

Past this most basic level, however, things become more complicated. Is organizational “justice” served by compensating individuals in accordance only with the monetary value they add to the organization? (And if this is the case, how would this added value be calculated, and by whom?) Or rather (on the other hand), would justice be served by organizations compensating individuals based not only on criteria such as value add, responsibility, and hours worked, but also based on what they, as individuals need to live outside the organization? The extremes are presented here not to take a position as to one or the other being “just,” but rather, to illustrate the complexity of “distributive justice” within an organization by using the extremes as points of reference.

As ethical leaders, achieving and maintaining organizational “justice” with regard to “distribution”—defined here most likely as a combination of compensation, benefits packages, and other perks that might be afforded an employee—will be a complex and tangled endeavor, where we are attempting to create the right, or as Aristotle would term it, “proportional” amount of equity between all parties involved in transactions.

The very nature of the organization itself will likely push us in one direction or the other, with regard to what we deem “fair” distribution. For example, a startup may require original employees to go without salary and benefits for a period of time, essentially gambling that the likelihood of distribution “payoff” will be sufficiently high to render this “just” for this particular organization and employees who have voluntarily agreed to participate within those parameters.

A non-profit or for-benefit organization, on the other hand, may be more likely—simply by virtue of its mission—to “distribute” compensation more liberally to its employees, or perhaps more equitably among its hierarchical ranks. Again, the extremes are used to illustrate the complexity of the principle itself as well as just a sampling of the variables in play.

Regardless of what we as ethical leaders ultimately determine (at a specific point in time) to be “just” with regard to matters of “distribution,” it seems clear that the morphing and evolution of both our organizations, the marketplace, and our communities as a whole will require that we give this matter ongoing attention and consideration.

And whatever we decide with regard to this critical element of “justice,” we know that our decisions will be smarter and wiser as we continue to nurture and cultivate a more comprehensive set of ethical virtues in ourselves and model them in our organizations.