Decency (Ευπρεπεια)

Aristotle on the Virtue of Decency as Contrasted with Justice

In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle refers not just to the virtuous man and the just man, but to the decent man, who appears to have qualities of both. As with other terms used by Aristotle, we must carefully assess whether our present-day connotation of decency aligns with Aristotle’s meaning, given both the translation from Greek to English as well as the variances in syntax from his time to ours for which translators have attempted to accurately account.

With regard to what Aristotle describes as “decency”—or epieikeia—broad translations include “fitting,” “suitable,” “reasonable,” and even “fair.” As Aristotle also uses some of these terms specifically on their own, however, without reference to “decency,” it is worthwhile to further examine the Greek in an attempt to reveal a more accurate and nuanced definition.†

As noted by Joseph Macfarland in his comparison of Aristotle’s use of terms “just” and “decent,” the latter derives from the Greek eioka, defined as “to seem likely” or “to befit.” He thus suggests that the term “decent” for Aristotle is most closely linked to what is “fitting,” fair, or appropriate. (Such a definition assumes that we are actually able to identify what is “fitting”—no less demonstrate it—in order to be “decent.”)†

Macfarland goes on to note that within Nicomachean Ethics, the term “epieikês” is most commonly translated by scholars as “equitable”—or what has been termed “fair” within this site—in matters of justice. Because “epieikês” is also used throughout Aristotle’s treatise specifically with regard to the individual, however—as well as to describe interactions between the individual and others (as is the case with justice)— it is widely accepted that this use of the term in relation to the individual is what we are referring to when we discuss Aristotle’s use of “decency.”†

Macfarland does mention, however, that Aristotle’s use of “decent” as an apparent descriptor of “human goodness” in an individual far surpasses in nobleness or virtue the term “decent” as it is commonly used today (i.e., as a term to describe something that is just basely satisfactory or acceptable).†

He then goes on to assess Aristotle’s almost passing mention of “decency” in discussions of other virtues—honesty (truthfulness), wit, and tact—finally landing on the meaty use of the term as Aristotle presents the complex virtue of justice.†

For this discussion, Macfarland brings us back to the linkage between “justice” and what is “lawful.” While Aristotle generally asserts that what is “lawful” is also what is “just,” he also acknowledges that what is lawful must in some senses be broad and general, in that it applies to many individuals and scenarios at one time. Almost by definition then, we can assume that there exist situations for which what is lawful may not necessarily be “just.”†

It is in his description of such outlying scenarios, Macfarland asserts, that Aristotle makes clear the level of “goodness” or “virtuousness” associated with the “decent” man, saying that in situations in which what is lawful is not in fact just, the “decent” man will do what is just rather than what is lawful, and in so doing, will be more virtuous than the man who does what is strictly lawful (and who, in that sense, is regarded as “just”).†

So in this respect, Aristotle seems to suggest that “decency” as a virtue is elevated even beyond “justice”—at least some imperfect forms of justice. It does also assume, however, that the “decent” man is able to both identify the injustice codified in the law and to act appropriately to correct that injustice. Such capabilities would clearly require, from his perspective, cultivation and maturation of associated virtues, which collectively would equip him with this level of insight.

This final point is underscored as Macfarland examines Aristotle’s use of “decency” within his larger discussion of the intellectual (versus moral) virtue of prudence, concluding, “Decency is that by which one chooses not to follow the general or categorical statement of the law, but to make an exception; prudence is that by which one selects the particular action that leads to the correctly desired end.”†

† Macfarland, Joseph C. “Two Good Men in Aristotle’s Ethics: The Virtuous and the Decent.” Lecture, St. John’s College, Annapolis, MD, August 26, 2016. (Available at academia.edu; login required)

 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Books 3 & 4

Translated from the original Greek by Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins*

“(Book 3) CHAPTER 5. Since the object of wish is the end, whereas the objects of deliberation and choice are the means conducive to the end, actions pertaining to these latter would accord with choice and be voluntary. And the activities of the virtues pertain to these means. Virtue too, then, is up to us, and similarly vice is as well. For in the cases in which it is up to us to act, so too is not acting; and where there may be a ‘no,’ there may also be a ‘yes.’ As a result, if acting, when it is noble to do so, is up to us, then also not acting, when it is shameful not to do so, will be up to us; and if not acting, when it is noble not to, is up to us, then also acting, when it is shameful to do so, is up to us. If doing the noble and the shameful things is up to us, and similarly also not doing them—and this, as we saw, amounts to our being good or bad—it is, therefore, up to us to be decent or base.”

“(Book 4) CHAPTER 9. It is not fitting to speak about a sense of shame as a particular virtue, for it seems more like a passion than a characteristic. It is defined, at any rate, as a certain fear of disrepute, and it turns out to resemble the fear of terrible things, for those who feel shame blush and those who fear death turn pale. Both, then, appear in some way to be bodily, which seems to be more a mark of a passion than of a characteristic.

But this passion is appropriate, not to every age but to the young; for we suppose that the young ought to be bashful because the many errors they make, in living by passion, are checked by a sense of shame. And we praise those of the young who are bashful, but no one would praise an older man because he is given to shame: we suppose that he ought not to do anything that incurs shame. Shame does not belong to a decent person either, since it occurs in connection with base things (for one must not do such things). And, whether these are shameful truly or shameful according to opinion makes no difference, for neither is to be done; as a result, one should not feel shame. And to be the sort of person to do anything shameful is the mark of someone base. But to be disposed to feel shame at doing any such thing, and on this account to suppose that one is decent, is strange. For shame attaches to voluntary acts, but the decent person will never voluntarily do base things. Yet a sense of shame might be a decent thing on the basis of a given hypothesis: if a person were to do something base, he would feel shame. But this does not pertain to the virtues: if shamelessness (or not being ashamed to do shameful things) is base, it is still no more the case that he who is ashamed to do these sorts of things is decent.”

*Aristotle. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Translated, with an interpretive essay, notes, and glossary by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins. London: University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 2011. (Available at Amazon)

Practical Application

for Ethical Leadership

As ethical leaders, it may be that our most significant takeaway from Aristotle’s discussion of decency should be not only that it is one of the highest virtues an individual may demonstrate, but also that it should be considered and acted on only with certain caveats.

For while we understand that decency, in a real sense, is a virtue to be more esteemed at times even than justice, we must remain aware at the same time that one’s ability to demonstrate decency rests upon “prerequisites” of a sort—that is to say, it rests upon the degree to which we have nurtured and habituated other related virtues, which, when suitably mature, provide us with the insight and judgement to be able to rightly act in accordance with what is decent over what is technically “just”( in the sense of being in accordance with laws or regulations).

So within our organizations, we will surely encounter scenarios that bear resemblance to those described by Aristotle in his discussion of justice.

That is, we will come across instances in which the organizational “rule of law,” so to speak—even where it has been crafted in a “just” way, such that it appropriately addresses individuals within the organization collectively—will actually be unjust when applied in certain “outlier” scenarios.

It is at this juncture that the ethical leader is aware of the incongruity of the rule and what is actually just, and can respond accordingly to correct the injustice. It is also at this moment that the mature leader will examine himself/herself internally to discern whether it is actually appropriate to make use of this “virtuous” allowance Aristotle from Aristotle to in some way “behave above the law.”

We must remain cognizant that we are only able to demonstrate such behavior after maturing a range of other virtues to the point that they coalesce into what might be called the insight and reasonable judgement required to appropriately override or supersede the law or regulation in question. Without such a foundation, it is unlikely that elevating our own “insights” above the law itself will result in a just outcome.

Even when we feel we have matured other requisite virtues sufficiently to accomplish “justice” that is not in accordance with the “law” or regulations, we may want to seek the counsel of more mature—or in Aristotle’s terms, virtuous and wise—advisors able to accurately and appropriate assess our reasoning, lest we act prematurely, or in an unjust manner.